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Abstract: The evolution of modern accounting consists essentially of
a series of pragmatic responses to the needs of capital. Accounting
is implicated, therefore, in the maintenance and creation of societies
in which relations are primarily defined in terms of property, how-
ever it is distributed, and justice is determined by the sanctity of
property rights. Accounting historians are encouraged to broaden
the compass of their research to include the association between
accounting and justice which is already well recognised in the criti-
cal accounting literature. Theories of justice, especially those of
19th century political theorists such as Bentham and Senior, and
more recently that of Nozick, are used to explore the close associa-
tion between property, accounting and justice at the time of the
Irish potato famine of 1845-7.
INTRODUCTION
Societies are founded on some understanding of justice,
however objectionable the dominant meanings of justice may
be perceived by those not favoured. All laws of government
emanate from this essential feature of social relations for no
government will survive without the assistance of significant
force if it is not able to convince a sufficient number of citizens
that their society is just. For David Hume, Aristotle and Adam
Smith justice was first among all the virtues. Smith stipulated
that “(j)ustice . . . is the main pillar that upholds the whole
edifice. If it is removed . . . the immense fabric of human soci-
ety . . . must in a moment crumble into atoms” [1976, Section
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II, Chapter ii, parts 4 and 6]. Smith did not have in mind the
distributive justice which we now associate with the achieve-
ment of social justice, notably that portrayed by Marshall
[1992]. Rather, Smith adopted a Lockean stance and identified
justice with the absence of any harm to either an individual’s
person or to their property; “preservation of property being the
end of government” [Locke, 1884, Book II, Chapter IX, section
138, also Chapter XIX, section 222]. Thus, the foundation of
justice in capitalist societies is securing property rights [Smith,
1976, Section VII, Chapter ii, part 10; see also Carter, 1989,
p.9]. Any threats to property rights, suggested Hume, were
equivalent to an attack on the sacred laws of God, the result of
which would be tyranny and the destruction of society [Hume,
1960, Book II, section 2, paragraph 2]. The intention of this
paper is not to promote one form of justice over another, rather
to show how accounting is compatible with, and essential to, an
interpretation of justice derived from the rights of property. It
is accepted that meanings attributed to justice are not absolute
but instead are the products of particular social contexts.
The intimate association between property rights and jus-
tice has long been recognised in theories of justice from
Aristotle [1905] to Thomas Aquinas [1969], through to the writ-
ings of political theorists such as Rousseau and Bentham dur-
ing the 18th and 19th centuries and most recently the highly
influential work of Robert Nozick [1974]. Nozick’s entitlement
theory of justice, which owes much to Adam Smith and the
utilitarianism of Bentham, proposes that distributions of
wealth are just if people are entitled to their holdings as a result
of being acquired through the exercise of the initial capacities
with which they were born or if their property was transferred
to them justly as a result of freely entered into exchanges
[Nozick, 1974, pp.150-153, 1993, p.286; see Sen, 1981, p.2 for a
similar approach1 ]. Nozick rejects the idea of the state taking
responsibility for achieving social justice if this relies upon a
conception of distributive justice in which voluntarism is cor-
rupted. The state, according to Nozick [1974, p.ix; 1993, p.285],
should limit itself to ensuring that entitlement rights, once con-
firmed as just, are secure. The dependency that Nozick sees
between justice, markets and the sanctity of entitlements de-
rived from property offers an attractive lens through which ac-
counting historians can examine the relationship between
1Sen defined entitlements as “the set of alternative commodity bundles
that a person can command” [Watts 2001, p.130].
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accounting and matters of justice. Indeed, a close study of
theories of justice, especially those which have been influential
over the past three centuries, offers accounting historians a
powerful critical means to probe the social roles served by ac-
counting. Although Nozick’s ideas are not canvassed in detail
for the purposes of the present paper, his theme of just entitle-
ments resonates with persuasive authenticity when examining
the role of accounting technologies in the context of the Irish
famine of 1845-7. During this period of great suffering, ac-
counting played an essential role in confirming the conditions
under which property entitlements were determined to be just
and in providing an apparatus for the state to laager these en-
titlements. Theories of property and justice, therefore, have
much to contribute to accounting history.
The work of accounting historians has consistently, if not
always manifestly, recognised the association between rever-
ence for the rights attached to property and the role of account-
ing. Cost accounting practices which are meant to discipline
the workforce to enhance the efficiency of production, and
thereby contribute to ever greater accumulations of property,
have been especially attractive to accounting historians [Hoskin
and Macve, 2000; Fleischman and Tyson, 1996; see Carnegie
and Potter, 2000 for a survey of the subjects preferred by ac-
counting historians]. The intimate determinacy between prop-
erty entitlements, justice and accounting, however, has yet to
establish a presence in the accounting history literature, despite
the prominence given to matters of social justice in the critical
accounting literature [Miller, 1990; Miller and O’Leary, 1987].
Accounting historians, notably Foucauldians [Hoskin and
Macve, 1986] and labour process theorists [Hopper and
Armstrong, 1991], have identified the oppressive consequences
for labour of the close association between property and ac-
counting. Yet, they have done so almost exclusively in terms of
onerous regimes of control rather than as matters of justice. As
citizens, accounting historians have an obligation to contribute
far more than providing justifications for, and explanations of,
accounting practices, whether located in the factory or in the
offices of government. Matters of justice are of great conse-
quence, as is the obligation of accounting historians to give
these prominence in their work. Of particular relevance to this
paper is the ability of accounting history to provide a persua-
sive means of demonstrating the social consequences of the
highly individualised approach of capitalism to government in
which property rights are paramount.
3
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Recent work by Fleischman and Tyson [2000] and Funnell
[1998] has edged accounting history away from more utilitarian
considerations to examine the effects when accounting is used
to serve ideologically racist ends. Still, the concern of these
papers is not expressly that of justice. This paper takes the pro-
cess further into the domain of justice, an area not explicitly
identified in the survey by Carnegie and Potter [2000] as having
penetrated accounting history to any significant degree. The
themes addressed are meant to encourage accounting histori-
ans to widen the compass of their interests to include the fun-
damental relationship between property, justice and accounting
in various social contexts in different historical epochs. The
paper acknowledges that accounting has served legal/political
systems which “more often than not . . . (have) served oppres-
sive, unjust, inhumane social arrangements” [Lyons, 1993, p.ix;
Neu, 2000]. It also demonstrates in the context of the Irish
famine of 1845-7 the intimate connection noted by Miller
[1990] and Miller and Rose [quoted in Neu, 2000, p.270] be-
tween the political rationalities of government and the tech-
nologies by which they are implemented.
Given the hortative intent of this paper, there is not the
opportunity to provide a detailed rendition of accountings dur-
ing the Irish famine. Instead, the focus is on the motives and
consequences of the regimes of accounting which were essen-
tial to the implementation of government policy as it concerned
the Irish. Accounting, as used by the British Government and
its administrators, is shown to have been implicated in the
prosecution of a particular, privileged form of justice which
gave pre-eminence to the interests of property, irrespective of
the desperation of the Irish poor. The only moral basis for de-
termining entitlements to relief outside the Poor Law was the
possession of property. Study of the Irish famine illustrates
how the moral agency of accounting is determined and legiti-
mated by prevailing economic and political structures and not
by any internal logic or calculus. Laws, as Rousseau [1973,
p.166] astutely observed, “are always of use to those who pos-
sess and harmful to those who possess nothing”.
After a discussion of the relevance of accounting to matters
of justice, attitudes towards property rights and poverty in the
19th century are shown to have constituted a moral discourse
of justice which was underpinned by accounting technologies.
The Irish potato famine of 1845-7 and government responses to
it under Peel and then Russell are used to illustrate the propo-
sition that in a capitalist society the form of justice which
4
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accounting can serve is that based upon property entitlements.
Indeed, accounting is essentially and substantially a technology
for enforcing these entitlements. The basis upon which the
government at Westminster determined who was eligible for
assistance during the famine and who would be excluded was
determined by the prevailing belief that government should not
intrude itself in the affairs of business, nor should government
take from the owners of property to provide for those, devoid of
property, whose destitution was a confession of their lack of
virtue. Only in this way would justice be served.
THE JUSTICE OF ACCOUNTING
Theories of justice are either based upon principles of per-
sonal freedom and individual rights, in which economic deserts
and merit determine entitlements, as epitomised by Nozick’s
entitlement theory of justice, or upon social effects where rights
are claimed on the basis of need and fairness [see Nozick, 1974,
p.90 and section II; Rawls, 1972]. The importance of the latter
conception of distributive justice was recognised in the late
18th century by Paine [1969, p.90] for whom it was inconceiv-
able that an individual had entered society “to become worse
than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had be-
fore”. J.S. Mill, who when writing had the benefit of drawing
upon the experiences of the Irish famine, also warned how a
society founded upon rules “by which it may protect its mate-
rial interests . . . will do nothing . . . for the spiritual interests of
society” [quoted in Goodin, 1995, p.12].
Accounting has had much to say about the justice of
deserts and lawful entitlements derived from the possession
of property — the concern of 19th century political econo-
mists (see below) — but has contributed little to interpreta-
tions of justice based upon need. Indeed, ensuring justice in
capitalist societies is the fundamental intent of accounting,
although only those interpretations of justice that are
grounded in property rights which have been secured and
consummated by the market exchanges praised by Adam
Smith. Accounting evolved from, and exists because of, the
needs of property arising out of its accumulation, protection
and legitimation. The morality that accounting promotes in a
capitalist economy, that is its interpretation of right and
wrong, merit and desert, is that associated with property en-
titlements. Accounting technologies have not been designed
to decide whether a given allocation of property and entitle-
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ments are either socially or morally defensible or to compen-
sate for social and economic inequalities, rather to recognise,
embrace and to protect these in the interests of those who
hold property. Accountants are not paid to be agents of so-
cial change. On the contrary, they are employed to take ad-
vantage of existing social relations and inequalities. There-
fore, any virtue that may be attributable to accounting arises
mainly from its success in serving the interests of property.
Ultimately, accounting involves “the communication of a set
of values, of ideals, of expected behaviour, of what is ap-
proved and disapproved” [Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p.448].
This allows accounting to play a highly influential role in
institutionalising particular, privileged values and beliefs.
The instrumental role of accounting is fundamental to the
indifference of the double-entry accounting calculus to the dis-
tribution of property and its associated entitlements which
double-entry accounting catalogues and makes visible. Its pri-
mary concerns are: an accurate rendition of a particular prop-
erty distribution, irrespective of any equity considerations; ad-
judicating between competing property claims and the
identification of either enhancements or diminutions of equity
in property. Debates in accounting history over the importance
given by Sombart, Weber and Tawney to double-entry book-
keeping in the rise of capitalism accept that any significance it
may have had was derived from its ability to serve the acquisi-
tive instincts of the propertied classes [Yamey, 1949; Winjum,
1972]. Therefore accounting, as a technology that perpetuates
existing entitlements, protects against actions other than those
consistent with, and sanctioned by, the relations of power that
accounting serves. Indeed, the objective, blind justice which
accounting is meant to serve has made it attractive to property
holders. This, as Cooper and Sherer [1984, p.208] have re-
minded us, does not deny that this amounts to accounting in-
formation being manipulated to favour particular interests to
enhance the distribution of property rights which they favour.
In this sense, accounting is certainly neither neutral nor objec-
tive. It is political because the consequences of accounting have
the ability to “benefit some groups in society and to the detri-
ment of others” [Cooper and Sherer, 1984, p.208]. The latter is
especially so when it comes to matters of justice and recogni-
tion by the state of entitlements which individuals claim for
themselves.
As an implement of power used to sustain inequality and
entrenched privilege based upon property entitlements,
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accounting was harnessed during the Irish famine of 1845-7 to
impoverish the existence of many and to deny opportunities for
redemption. Accounting provided the means to exclude, silence,
condemn and dismiss the urgent entreaties of those without the
necessary property to legitimate their claims on the state. Dur-
ing the famine, accounting technologies were essential to the
British Government’s determination to follow a policy of mini-
mal, reluctant interference for fear of upsetting the market,
alienating owners of property and, so they thought, threatening
the very foundations of society.
NINETEENTH CENTURY ATTITUDES TOWARDS
PROPERTY AND POVERTY
Advocacy of laissez-faire government by liberals in the 19th
century amounted to the protection of the interests of property
against any state imposts. According to Bentham, the state ex-
isted to “maintain the distribution . . . (of property) as it is actu-
ally established. It is this which under the name of justice, is
regarded as . . . (its) first duty” [Bentham, 1871, p.119]. Nassau
Senior, as did Locke [1884, Book II, section 222], saw “the great
object and the great difficulty in government is the preservation
of individual property” [Senior, 1868, p.1]. Similarly, Hobbes
believed that “Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man
his own” [Hobbes, 1968, Part I, Chapter XV, pp.201-2, emphasis
in the original]. Individuals’ rights could only guaranteed as
long as property rights were treated as sacred and recognised as
the foundation of society. Thus, Bentham [1960, Book II, Part I,
Section X] defined property in terms of “a relation betwixt a
person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the
free use and possession of it, without violating the laws of jus-
tice . . .”2  (emphasis in the original). Property and justice were
inseparable, for property consisted of “those goods, whose con-
stant possession is establish’d by the laws of society; that is, by
the laws of justice. . . . ‘Tis very preposterous, therefore, to
imagine that we have any idea of property, without fully com-
prehending the nature of justice . . . (for) the origin of justice
2According to Honore [1961, pp.112-113] property ownership comprises
“the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the
income of the thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights of
incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of harmful
use”.
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explains that of property” [Bentham, 1960, Book III, Part II,
Section II].3
Most of the more odious consequences of the self interest
motivated by the attractions of property, however, were of little
concern to political theorists who were highly influential in the
19th century, especially Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Hobbes,
Joseph Townsend and Nassau Senior, all of whom were unani-
mous in their praise of the virtues of untrammelled property
rights. Bentham was indifferent to how ‘the good’ created by
self-interested behaviour was distributed throughout society
and was unconcerned about the inevitable resulting inequali-
ties. Instead, inequalities were accepted by Bentham as part of
the natural order, arising as they do from the differential distri-
bution of abilities throughout the population [see Nozick, 1993,
p.286-289].
The morality of actions for utilitarians was only to be
judged according to their impact on the overall wellbeing or
happiness of society, not the pain experienced by one group of
individuals. Justice was the outcome of the enforcement of a
common set of procedural rules enshrined in law which gov-
erned the behaviour of all. Justice was not determined by the
fairness of the outcomes but by the fairness of the processes or
rules which are followed along the way. Denying one group
their rightful possession of property, acquired according to
these rules, was the illegitimate exercise of government powers
and was unjust.
Whereas poverty in the 19th century was widely regarded
as the absence of the means of entitlement, the consequence of
“fraud, indolence, and improvidence” [Report of the Poor
Law Commission 1834, cited in Ashcraft, 1995, p.46], property
was the result of foresight, moral rectitude and evidence of
a virtuous life. Accordingly, the poor had no entitlement
rights; they could expect nothing. Society was under no obliga-
tion to protect non-existent rights. Bentham, whose influence in
the 19th century Macpherson [1978, pp.39, 50] describes as
“immense”, argued that we can only expect to be treated as we
have acted; good for good, evil for evil [see Bentham in Berger,
1984, p.158]. To talk about natural rights, therefore, was a
3At the time that the American Constitution was being finalised, James
Madison drew attention to the way in which “those who hold and those who
are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society … The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of
modern legislation” [The Federalist Papers, Number 10].
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‘nonsense’. Only those who do well deserved to be treated well.
These views were given a sympathetic, if somewhat extreme,
rendition at the height of the Irish famine by The Economist [30
January 1847] which protested against the ongoing expense of
providing relief, irrespective of how inadequate it may have
been. Relief should not aim to avoid deaths at any cost, for “if
left to the natural law of distribution, those who deserved more
would obtain it”. Thus, in order that the poor did not unfairly
burden property owners, it was essential that relief went only to
the deserving poor [Irish Poor Laws, 1 and 2 Vic. c.56, July
1838]. The undeserving poor, that is those who were seen by
government to be poor because of their indolence and immoral-
ity, were to be identified and excluded from any assistance
which did not involve work on their part. Like everyone, they
had the ability to redeem themselves from their state of moral
and economic want through their own industry and providence.
Hard work and diligence allowed paupers to rise out of their
state of dependence and assume the right to control their own
life.
Towards the end of the 18th century, Frederick Eden had
denounced any attempts to alleviate the suffering of the poor at
the expense of property as a case of humanity exceeding good
sense which contradicted the fundamentals of political
economy [Eden, 1797; see Eden in Cowherd, 1977, p.xiv; also
Senior, 1868, p.178]. Social measures which sought to redress
economic disadvantage, thought Bentham, should only be con-
templated while ever they do “not interfere with security; in
which it does not thwart the expectations which the law itself
produced, in which it does not derange the order already
established” [quoted in Macpherson, 1978, p.43]. That is, social
reforms could be tolerated as long as property rights were not
threatened. This view was shared with Hobbes who, over a
century earlier, had also concluded that without order to pro-
tect property rights “there is no place for Industry; because the
fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the
Earth . . . And the life of man, solitary poore, nasty, brutish, and
short” [Hobbes, 1968, Part I, Chapter XIII, p.186].
The stimulus to work which poverty provided, according to
Malthus, was “absolutely necessary to promote happiness of the
great mass of mankind” [quoted in Boyer, 1990, p.56; for simi-
lar thoughts see Burke in Ashcraft, 1995, p.55]. Joseph
Townsend in 1786 denounced poor relief as unnatural. He re-
minded his readers that:
9
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. . . hope and fear are the springs of industry . . . In
general it is only hunger which can spur and goad . . .
(the poor) on to labour. They say that . . . no man, even
though by his indolence, improvidence, prodigality and
vice, he may have brought himself to poverty, shall
ever suffer from want . . . (Some) must want [quoted in
Boyer 1990, p.52; see also Senior’s views in Bowley,
1967, p.291].
Edwin Chadwick, who along with Nassau Senior made the
greatest contributions to the 1834 English Poor Law Report,
described poverty as “the natural, the primitive, the general and
unchangeable state of man; and as labour is the source of
wealth, so is poverty of labour. Banish poverty, you banish
labour” [quoted in Cowherd, 1977, p.245; see also Senior, 1868,
p.187]. Significantly for those who would later starve in Ire-
land, Senior and Chadwick were as one in their admiration for
the redemptive powers of property [Senior quoted in Bowley,
1967, pp.239-240]. When famine struck in 1845, the fate of the
Irish poor, therefore, was sealed as much by prevailing eco-
nomic doctrine as by the perfidy of nature. Tragically, it was
also dramatically exacerbated by the rigid, unyielding bureau-
cratic behaviour of relief personnel which was induced by the
minutiae of the accounting controls required by their master,
the British Treasury.
THE IRISH POTATO FAMINE 1845-7
Origins and Consequences: Famines, as Malthus [1798] was only
too eager to confirm, have been a regular occurrence through-
out history and over most parts of the globe. Ireland’s perilous
dependency on the potato had seen repeated food shortages of
varying severity and extent. The 1830s were particularly known
for food crises occasioned by crop failures somewhere in Ire-
land [Woodham-Smith, 1962, p.38; O’Rourke, 1902, pp.30, 34].
None, however, had approached the severity of that which ex-
tended over Ireland between 1845-7. By the end of the 1840s
over one million Irish had perished from hunger and associated
disease and another two million had emigrated to escape the
misery. A measure of the extent of the tragedy which was
visited upon Ireland, and the commonplace of death, can be
gauged from a report in the Cork Southern Reporter in 1846.
The newspaper’s correspondent described seeing in a cabbage
garden “the bodies of Kate Berry and her two children very
lightly covered with earth, the hands and legs of her large body
10
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entirely exposed, the flesh entirely eaten off by the dogs, the
skin and hair of the head lying within a couple of yards of the
skull” [quoted in O Grada, 1989, p.42].
The first hint of the appearance of yet another threat to the
potato crop came in a report from the Isle of Wight in August
1845 which warned that the potato blight, which had recently
ravaged potato yields in North America, had now hit England.
By September the fungus Phythophthoria infestans was in Ire-
land [Black, 1960, p.10; O’Rourke, 1902, pp.48-54]. Responses
by the British Government to the famine occurred in two
phases; the first during the government of Sir Robert Peel,
which lost office in July 1846 after repealing the Corn Laws,
and that of its successor, the government of Lord John Russell.
Unfortunately for the Irish, Peel’s unusual preparedness to in-
tervene early in the crisis with the secret purchase of Indian
corn meal from North America was not carried forward by
Lord Russell [British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP), 1846
[735], Vol.XXXVII, p.21; Black, 1960, p.114]. The opposition of
Russell towards most forms of government-sponsored relief for
Ireland, especially any action which threatened the profits of
merchants, was made very clear in a letter from Sir George
Grey, a minister in Russell’s Cabinet, to a British official in
Ireland who had sought additional funding. Grey had “the
strongest objection to any grant from the Public Treasury in aid
of or as a substitute for the rate for the relief of the poor” [Sir
George Grey to Mr Twisleton, 21 December 1846, BPP 1847,
Vol.LV, pp.12-13; see also Trevelyan to Routh, BPP 1846, [735],
Vol.XXXVII, p.26].
Immediately after the replacement of the Peel Government
was announced in July 1846, the Treasury's most senior officer
in the field in Ireland, who as a Treasury employee had been
trained to “cheesepare, to save a farthing wherever a farthing
could be saved” [Woodham-Smith, 1962, p.58], was directed by
the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, Charles Trevelyan, that
all relief arrangements in place “should be stopped or you run
the risk of paralysing all private enterprise . . . The only way to
prevent the people from becoming habitually dependent on
Government . . . is to bring the operations to a close” [Trevelyan
quoted in Woodham-Smith, 1962, p.89]. A second crop failure
in 1846 was again met by Trevelyan’s determination to make
sure that the government did not interfere with the operation of
markets, even if these were for basic foodstuffs [Trevelyan to
Coffin, 3 April 1846, BPP, 1846, [735], Vol.XXXVII, p.101].
Significantly, Peel had been very aware of opposition in the
11
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Treasury to any forms of government-sponsored relief and had
encouraged those entrusted with the relief effort not to be frus-
trated by the Treasury [see Sir James Graham in O’Neil, 1957,
p.214].
Despite the scale of the famine, as the death toll mounted
throughout 1846 and 1847 large amounts of agricultural prod-
ucts were still being exported from Ireland to meet demand in
England, which was also suffering from food shortages arising
from the potato blight. This merely continued the existing set of
arrangements which saw between 1843 and 1845 over 463,000
tons of food exported, irrespective of persistent food shortages
in many regions of Ireland [O Grada, 1989, p.33; Editorial, The
Waterford Freeman, 3 October 1946, in Kissane, 1995, pp.54-55;
BPP, 1850, Vol.XVII, p.423]. As with any unfettered market in
which products migrate to where the highest price is promised,
during the Irish famine no impediments existed to the search
for equilibrium between demand and supply. Abject need
which, in the absence of financial means, could not be trans-
lated into an economically enforceable entitlement, had no rel-
evance to the most efficient disposition of food supplies, as
opposed to distribution based upon humane considerations.
The strict rendition of the principles of 19th century politi-
cal economy, which both the governments of Peel and Russell
insisted on moralistically applying, meant that the only entitle-
ments which were morally and economically defensible were
those exercised in and derived from market exchanges [see Sen,
1981, pp.161, 162]. Those able-bodied who could meet the
qualifications of entitlement, that is they had sufficient money
to buy food, would be fed while others would starve. Accord-
ingly, widespread starvation may have been initiated by the
potato blight but famine was induced by the absence of the
necessary means to exercise purchasing power in the market
and, therefore, in a society dominated by the rights of property
and market utopianism, the absence of entitlement. Liberal
capitalism according to Watts [2001, p.127] had become a “gi-
gantic killing machine”.
Relief, the British Treasury and Centres of Calculation: The re-
sponses of the British Government to the famine, especially
from late 1846, were conditioned primarily by the prevailing
economic antipathy towards virtually all forms of government
intrusion in the operation of markets. All demands on the
public purse were to be strenuously resisted. This sacred task
was entrusted to the Treasury, which from the earliest evidence
12
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of impending widespread starvation in 1845 was already in at-
tendance in Ireland. Although the Treasury accepted that the
Irish could not be left completely to their fate, it went to ex-
traordinary lengths to make sure that food went only to those
amongst the desperate who had met the necessary property
qualifications of entitlement. All the time, Treasury officers
were to ensure that their accounting reports provided the nec-
essary evidence that these entitlements, and only these, had
been met. To ensure that all payments “were duly accounted for
and properly vouched”, the Treasury established very early that
“accounts of every description of expenditure connected with
the expected relief should be . . . promptly rendered to the Com-
missioners of Audit (at the Audit Office) at the close of every
month” [Trevelyan to Routh, January 1846, BPP, [735],
Vol.XXXVII, pp.16,17]. The close association between the Audit
Office in London and the Treasury's agents the Commissariat
was strengthened with the appointment of auditors from the
Audit Office to Ireland [Treasury Minute, 9 October 1846,
Trevelyan to Routh, 10 October 1846, BPP, 1847 [761], Vol.LI,
pp.134, 137].
All monies for the purpose of relief had to go through the
Treasury and be accounted for by the Treasury which, espe-
cially after the passage of the Audit Act, 1846 was ascendant in
all matters of financial control. An examination of the immense
array of Treasury documents, which stipulate the need for a
seemingly endless number of accounting checks and account-
ing reports essentially as protections against unauthorised
spending, unmistakably reveals the primary concern of the
Treasury during the famine to be financial rectitude [see par-
ticularly good examples in BPP, 1847-48, Vol. XXIX, p.956ff
and 1846, Vol.XXXVII, p.615ff]. As the government’s financial
gatekeeper, the Treasury made sure that the officials authorised
to spend any monies did so according to regulations and ac-
counted for them in a punctilious fashion. Through its account-
ing reports the Treasury was able, in terms of Miller’s [1990,
p.318] description, to govern at a distance through their centres
of calculation located at Commissariat depots, principal
amongst which were those at Cork and Limerick. Treasury
regulations and accounting reports provided a constant and ev-
ery present means of disciplining behaviour. Through the work
of the Commissariat, whose later actions in the Crimean War
(1854-6) were to become infamous [Funnell, 1990], the
Treasury was able to exert an intimate and suffocating control
over all relief measures, including those initiated by private
13
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charities. The numerous accounting reports required by the
Treasury epitomised Foucault’s systems of disciplinary surveil-
lance by giving visibility to the smallest aspects of the
Commissariat’s operations, thereby constraining any tendencies
to respond to the emergency other than on the sure grounds of
indifferent, meticulous instrumentalism. Treasury policies and
the prejudices of the government were ineffectual without the
means by which they could be prosecuted. Thus, accounting
provided the technologies to enforce the exclusion of those who
were condemned as undeserving of assistance. Entitlements
justified on economic grounds were the natural domain of ac-
counting calibrations.
The Commissariat was the primary means by which the
British army was provisioned both in Ireland and wherever else
it operated. Woodham-Smith [1962, p.58] described it as “a
civilian department of clerks” which became involved in civilian
affairs only in the most extreme circumstances. In all matters
pertaining to its operations, the allegiance of the Commissariat
was firstly to the Treasury, to whom all staff would be held
personally liable for all expenditures, stores and monies. The
first concern of the Commissariat, therefore, was a rigid adher-
ence to Treasury rules, conventions and wishes, most of which
found expression in accounting reports. Far too frequently this
put Commissariat officers at odds with their own consciences
which, in the distressing circumstances in which they worked,
may have compelled them to show more compassion [see com-
ments by Commissary General Routh in Woodham-Smith,
1962, p.91]. When Trevelyan announced the appointment of
Routh as Commissary General in November 1845, he made it
very clear that his primary duty was to:
. . . consider, and to call attention to, . . . the financial
bearings of the measures which may be proposed for
this purpose, . . . the object in view being to provide
and dispense any supplies of food which it may be-
come necessary to afford, according to such arrange-
ments as will impose the smallest possible ultimate bur-
den on the public . . . You will be careful, however, not
to be a party to any promise of public money . . . unless
under express authority from the Treasury [Trevelyan to
Routh, BPP, 1846, [735], Vol.XXXVII, pp.21-22, em-
phasis added].
The purpose of the Commissariat food depots was to aug-
ment food supplies available from private contractors. The
Treasury specifically prohibited Commissariat food stores from
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being opened in areas in which private suppliers already
existed. The Commissariat was to take particular care not to go
into competition with private firms or, if this was unavoidable,
to ensure that the prices that it charged were slightly above
those of its competitors [Treasury Minute, 31 August 1846, in
O’Rourke 1902, p.170, see also p.222 and Treasury Minute of 29
September 1846, on p.226]. Only when private supplies had
been exhausted would there be a call for its stores. In a letter
from Trevelyan to Commissary General Routh in late 1846,
Routh was told that “the Chancellor of the Exchequer will on
no account permit you to undertake to provide food for any
portion of the eastern district of Ireland . . . No exigency how-
ever pressing, is to induce you to furnish supplies of food for any
districts except those for which you have already undertaken”
[quoted in O’Neil, 1957, p.224, emphasis added].
The moral character of poverty and the moral effects of
assistance, as previously noted, readily and conveniently justi-
fied harsh policies of exclusion from sources of relief. Adminis-
trators of poor relief during the famine were admonished to be
vigilant to ensure that those assisted were not merely the desti-
tute who in usual circumstances perennially afflicted Ireland.
Only those who had been cast into a state of need solely as a
consequence of the failure of the potato crop could be regarded
as candidates for assistance. This required that a firm stand be
taken “against the prevailing disposition to take advantage of
the crisis” [Trevelyan to Routh, February 1846, BPP, 1846,
[735], Vol.XXXVII, p.18]. The aim was never to eliminate pov-
erty, the natural state of many. When in 1846 soup kitchens
were proposed by several Union Boards of Governors, Edward
Senior, Assistant Poor Law Commissioner, refused to allow
them on the basis of moral consequences. It was wrong to feed
“the whole body of the poor, in return for no work, subject to
no test, with a better and more expensive description of food
than they have ever been accustomed to” [correspondence of
Edward Senior, 28 October 1846, BPP, 1847, Vol.LV, p.24].
Nassau Senior, a highly influential political economist, saw
poverty to be the result of “misconduct” and not “misfortune”, a
position he shared with Ricardo, Mill, Malthus and Bentham,
all of whom favoured the abolition of the poor laws and poor
relief [see Checkland and Checkland, 1974, pp.29-31]. Accord-
ing to Nassau Senior:
. . . the duty of the Government is simply to keep the
peace, to protect all its subjects from the violence and
15
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fraud and malice of one another, and, having done so,
to leave them to pursue what they believe to be their
interests in the way which they deem advisable [quoted
in Bowley, 1967, p.242].
Sir Charles Wood’s relentless determination, as Chancellor
of the Exchequer, and that of his energetic subordinate
Trevelyan, to ensure that the vaults of the nation would not be
breached by the desperate poor and starving betrayed an im-
plicit faith in the ability of ‘natural’ market processes to deal
with most problems involving the supply of material needs. In a
letter to the progressive Irish landowner Lord Monteagle, Wood
said that “the more I see of government interference the less I
am disposed to trust it, and I have no faith in anything but
private capital employed under individual charge” [quoted in
Black, 1960, p.39]. Wood’s uncompromising stand on spending
public funds, as befitted a senior representative of the Treasury,
lead Woodham-Smith [1962, p.87] to observe that he “united
love of liberty with reverence for property . . . Humanitarianism
was not among his undoubted virtues”. In a similar vein Taylor
[1976, p.75] concluded that:
. . . it is easy to understand how Trevelyan and the rest
thought that they were doing their duty. They were
handling human beings as ciphers on a bit of paper.
They looked up the answers in a textbook of economics
without ever once setting eyes on the living skeletons of
the Irish people. . . . (These) enlightened men feared
that their whole social structure would topple down if
men and women were given food they could not pay
for.
The moral inflexibility of the Treasury during the famine
saw it treat starving individuals as financial burdens on the
public purse which were to be minimised by restrictive qualifi-
cations for entitlement to relief, irrespective of the frantic re-
ports coming from its officers in the field. The only representa-
tion of the calamity in Ireland relevant to the Treasury was that
which was to be found in the accounting for costings, invento-
ries, receipts and loans. The mounting death toll, many of
whom died in close proximity to the Commissariat depots,
could be seen as vindication that the Treasury’s policies were
working as intended. Their work was not to save everyone in
need, only those who by economic entitlement could afford to
pay, which gave them the moral right to sustenance, or had
been brought under the mean protection of the Poor Laws as a
16
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result of physical or mental infirmity. During the emergency,
while the hungry who did not meet these qualifications for as-
sistance could be heard crying outside the depot gates, the
Treasury was effectively carrying out its work.
Thus, at regular intervals a strict accounting for the
amount of food provided by the Commissariat required a me-
ticulous reconciliation against lists of those eligible for assis-
tance. One official in Ireland reassured Trevelyan that he would
not let the “pressure of the people” deflect him from “purging
the lists of all persons not requiring assistance” and that he was
“determined never to flag, though the country is in a dreadful
state” [BPP, 1847, Vol.L, p.293]. Uncalculating compassion had
no place in Treasury policies and practices which were the ad-
ministrative manifestation of the prevailing, intolerant attitude
towards the Irish poor and the righteous appreciation of the
virtues of property ownership. While entitlements were deter-
mined by property qualifications and the need to minimise en-
croachments on property rights, accounting was nothing less
than a technology which served policies and practices which
were indifferent to physical want and any conceptions of justice
other than those derived from property.
CONCLUSION
The Irish famine exposed the ultimate consequences for a
society based upon a conception of justice where entitlements
were defined entirely in terms of the rights of property holders
and where the primary function of the state and its agencies,
notably the Treasury, was to protect these rights. As a technol-
ogy which evolved in response to the needs of property, ac-
counting was indispensable to policies of relief which served
the interests of property. The interdependence between entitle-
ment and justice, introduced in this paper through Robert
Nozick’s work, meant that the legitimacy of claims on the com-
passion of the state was determined according to the moral
worth afforded to each individual by their property and not
need. Pleas for rescue by the able-bodied on the basis of abject
need were dismissed as illegitimate demands on the rights of
the virtuous. The teachings of prominent political economists,
notably Bentham, Senior and Locke, which advocated minimal
government interference in the lives of citizens, both prepared
the ground for government responses and provided a ready
supply of justifications for all but the most uneasy consciences.
Justice, as sanctioned by 19th century utilitarians and
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confirmed by Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice, could only
ever mean defence of entrenched interests.
The Irish died in large numbers during the potato famine
because they did not have the means to acquire legal entitle-
ment to food, not because there was a complete absence of
food. The unrelenting indifference with which those in desper-
ate need were regarded by senior British administrators intent
on minimising government obligations was compounded when
the government placed all responsibility for administering and
delivering relief in the hands of the Treasury. At all times, the
financial consequences for the public purse of any actions to
ameliorate distress were to be given pre-eminence by the Trea-
sury and its servants in the field. Most important to the Trea-
sury in the dispensing of relief was meticulous stewardship of
public resources by ensuring that all money and stores could be
rigorously accounted for and that assistance went only to the
eligible who met prevailing morality and economic tests. En-
forcement of these proscriptions by the Treasury was made pos-
sible through a myriad of finely detailed accounting controls
which sought to protect public property from the impertinent
demands of the dying and private property from improper gov-
ernment levies or interference with the market. Whether in
deciding upon the extent of the government’s contribution to
relief, the mode of relief or the qualifications for relief, account-
ing information figured prominently in providing justifications,
legitimation and the means to control the relief effort.
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